Because discussion of North Korea tends to be so heavily focused on the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, regime survival and the increasing number of refugee claimants fleeing famine and gross human rights abuses, it is easy to fall back on the assumption that these issues constitute the most pressing concerns for all actors within the Asia Pacific region and beyond.  After all, what could be more important to the security and sovereignty of nearby states than preventing the devastation sure to occur during nuclear conflict or in the relatively unlikely event of regime collapse?

This perspective may be extremely common, especially for those who have little firsthand knowledge or experience with the intricacies of unique national historical and sociopolitical contexts, but it fails to take into account the variety of other interests and objectives held by regional actors. Japan is a case in point: although it is certainly concerned with the DPRK’s alleged ability to launch a nuclear strike, the Japanese government is currently much more invested in resolving the ongoing dispute over North Korea’s abduction of a number of its citizens in the 1970s and 80s.  Indeed, Professor Norihito Kubota of the National Defense Academy of Japan identifies abduction as the “core issue” defining Japanese-North Korean relations in the present context, and Japan’s domestic politics more generally.

In a landmark 2002 meeting between the North Korean and Japanese governments Kim Jong Il admitted for the first time that between 1977 and 1983 North Korean agents abducted thirteen Japanese citizens, with the ostensible intention of stealing their identities and forcing the abductees to train North Korean spies to better assimilate into Japanese society.  Kim’s admission legitimized the long-held suspicions of many Japanese that the DPRK had violated sovereign territory and engaged in terrorist acts, but his corresponding apology by no means put an end to the indignation and anger emanating from a substantial portion of Japan’s population. Public opinion polls conducted by the Japanese government beginning in 2000 show that Japanese citizens ranked abduction as the number one North Korean issue of interest prior to Kim’s disclosure, a figure that jumped substantially following the 2002 meeting.

It is this strong affective reaction, Kubota stated in his presentation to the North Korea Research Group, largely stemming from assertive Japanese nationalism and moral outrage, that has encouraged Japan’s government to pursue various policies of censure and inducement in order to encourage the DPRK to forthrightly respond to calls for more transparency about the fate of those held by the North Korean regime.

While the abduction of Japanese citizens may constitute the primary issue of concern to the Japanese public, the country’s government cannot simply ignore the reality of North Korea’s military capabilities given the countries’ close proximity.  In this respect, and in contrast to its focus on the abduction issue, Japan’s approach to North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship has been rather reserved.  Throughout the duration of the Cold War Japan’s threat perception of North Korea was negligible compared to the United States, the Soviet Union and China, all of whom Japan viewed as the source of serious challenges to its sovereignty and security.  It was only in 1998, when the DPRK launched two missiles eastward, that Japan acknowledged North Korea to be a viable military threat, although the government presently maintains that the nuclear test in 2006 has ultimately failed and that to view North Korea as a technologically superior enemy is to exaggerate its actual capabilities.

Operating from this perspective, Japan has engaged in modest efforts to protect itself without going to a defensive extreme: in concert with the United States Japan embarked on the construction of a ballistic missile shield, building high resolution radars and several limited-range missile interceptors with the express purpose of protecting major Japanese cities from an attack by Pyongyang.  At the same time, Japan is reluctant to expend significantly more money and effort on self-defense programs for a number of reasons.  First, because the particular ballistic missile owned by North Korea is technically difficult to counter there is no defensive capability that is wholly sufficient to protect Japan.  Moreover, despite Japan’s willingness to engage in a partnership with the United States it does not want to uniformly embrace American plans for more extensive militarization than is actually justifiable.  Finally, framing both of these concerns is the fact that Japan is constitutionally barred from settlings conflicts with military force and does not want to cause an avoidable escalation of tension in the region.  In Japan’s eyes, North Korea may pose a nuclear threat but the urgency of the situation is not so grave that immediate action is required.

Insofar as Japan’s approach to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is more moderate compared to other states, Japan can be seen as a force of stability both regionally and internationally. The raw emotion still surrounding the abductions, however, not to mention other issues such as legacies of war and colonialism, bring a degree of volatility to the situation that may complicate further attempts at reconciliation or at the very least normalization.  Because of its comparatively powerful position and reluctance to rush into any particular political or military trajectories without careful consideration, Japan’s greatest contribution to ensuring or promoting regional stability will likely be its moderating effect.

Supplementary Materials & Further Reading

Governmental Documents:

1. Ministry of Defense. “Defense of Japan 2007.” edited by Ministry of Defense: Inter Group, 2007
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. “Diplomatic Bluebook 2006.” edited by Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Urban Connections, 2006

Secondary Sources:

1. Akaha, Tsuneo. “Japanese Policy toward the North Korean Problem: Balancing Bilateralism and Multilateralism.” Journal of Asian and African studies 42, no. 3-4 (2007): 297-320
2. Farnham, Barbara, ed. Avoiding Losses/ Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994
3. Funabashi, Yoichi. The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007
4. Kamiya, Matake. “A Disillusioned Japan Confronts North Korea.” Arms Control Today 33, no. 4 (2003): 19-22
5. Kang, David C. “Japan: U.S. Partner or Focused on Abductees?” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2005): 107-17
6. Kim, Hong Nack, and Jack L. Hammersmith. “Japanese-North Korean Relations after the Second Pyongyang Summit of 2004.” North Korean Review 4, no. 1 (2008): 74-90

Websites:

1. Japan-North Korea Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/index.htm)
2. Results of Opinion Polls, Cabinet Office (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-gai.html), in Japanese
3. Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, Government of Japan (http://www.rachi.go.jp/en/index.html)
4. Ministry of Defense (http://www.mod.go.jp/e/index.html)
5. Suspected Abduction Cases by North Korea, National Police Agency (http://www.npa.go.jp/keibi/gaiji1/index_e.html)
6. National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (http://www.sukuukai.jp/narkn/)
7. Investigation Commission on Missing Japanese Probably Related to N. Korea (http://www.chosa-kai.jp/indexeng.htm)

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