In any humanitarian or developmental assistance policy, there exist a variety of moral and operational dilemmas. North Korea is perhaps the epitome of such a dilemma. Quietly snuggled behind the front page news of the volatile global market, a few articles are connected to this specific quandary.

US envoy Christopher Hill recently returned from his talks with North Korea on the nuclear issue and described the talks as “substantive.” However, the really interesting news article is one that reports that a South Korean lawmaker has accused the North of buying $65 million (US) worth of weapons over the past five years. This is quite the substantial amount of money although none too surprising if one follows the 2004 US Congressional Research Service Report, which shows that North Korea used 25% of its GDP for military expenditures in 2002.

Consider this supposed military spending to Canada’s $2.4 million (US) contribution last year for international relief to North Korea and the World Food Programme’s recent launch of an emergency operation in North Korea of about half a billion dollars (US) to feed approximately 6.2 million people. That’s about equivalent to $8 million (US) per week to sustain the aid needed.  Although not verified by the Chinese government, it has been noted recently in international circles that China, which had in the past supplied 20-40% of the food relief, may have stopped its food shipments since April of this year. The new South Korean government has reportedly also stopped fertilizer shipments. And yet the WFP warns that there is still need for major relief in North Korea this year.

This is the moral dilemma. Should Canada and the international community provide assistance? A seemingly hostile country which threatens its neighbours with a nuclear arsenal, a government that seems to have constrained donor access and frustrated efforts of transparency, and the rather diverse speculations on Kim Jong Il’s health. Should we, guided by our humanitarian concerns, strain ourselves to be impartial, and follow the stated UN rules and principles to provide relief? Conversely, by providing assistance, could we be potentially prolonging the problem for long-term even if we help people now. Still, then again, can we justify the starvation of millions of people now, without any assured difference of outcomes over the long-term if we deny assistance? Since 1995, international humanitarian agencies have been working in North Korea and some of them, citing adverse working conditions and lack of transparency have left. Dr. James Orbinski, former president of MSF during its residence in North Korea was in attendance in the seminar last week discussing these dilemmas and was one of the groups who struggled with this fundamental question. In the end, MSF decided to leave. However, most organizations have continued in delivering assistance to North Korea, arguing a need to gradually develop working relations and confidence with the government.

There are positive signs. Recently, the WFP has reported that the North Korean government has increased its level of cooperation with the international communuity by allowing greater access to the WFP to the hardest hit areas. The WFP previously needed to give two-week notification in order to gain permission to visit these regions, however recently, the rules have been changed, and its staff are only required to notify the relevant authorities and can then go. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the total number approved international staff at the WFP Office in Pyongyang, increasing from barely 10 to 59 staff members, with over 20 of them working in the six new field offices to monitor food distributions. What is even more heartening is the inclusion of Korean speakers within the staff.

Professor Gregory Chin of York University states that, as part of a policy of engagement, we should continue with humanitarian assistance, while being conscious of the risks and taking risk mitigating measures, and also give systematic thought to developing a coherent developmental assistance strategy that could be actioned if circumstances changed. Professor Chin asked whether the food security problems in North Korea are structural or temporary.  If it is the former, then it raises serious questions of the viability of supporting a policy of grain self-sufficiency for North Korea.  Some analysts, including those inside major international organizations have examined the prospect of whether North Korea’s agricultural endowment may be limited to such a degree that even under optimal weather conditions, and with improvements in efficiency and distribution systems, it may not be good policy to pursue grain self-sufficiency in this context.  A coherent aid strategy for North Korea may actually be more effective if it focuses on building capacity in industry and commerce, with the aim of strengthening North Korea’s ability to import needed food supplies, as well as developing new international institutional mechanisms such as a global food security fund that could be drawn on to help ensure  that North Korea could procure international supplies of food at reasonable cost in times of need.

So, what can we conclude from this? How does one approach this question? Dr Orbinski and the experience of the MSF highlight the dilemmas that haunt when engaging North Korea in humanitarian assistance.  Dr Chin offers policy and programming principles, and new institutional measures for trying to break beyond the ethical and operational impasse. Food for thought.

Supplementary Materials & Further Reading

2. Hazel Smith (2002) Overcoming Humanitarian Dilemmas in the DPRK, Special Report 90, United States Institute of Peace

3. Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Reference Table (FAO/FSAU June 2006)

4. Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (OECD, 2005)

5. Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (OECD, 2003)

6. Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2007 (Bank of Korea, 2008)

7. Statistics on North Korea’s Economy from 1996 to 2007 (Bank of Korea)

8. Major food assistance programme planned for DPRK (WFP, 2008)

Popularity: 35% [?]